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A Reverse Marshall Plan for Anti-Corruption: Liberal Democracies Can Fill the Void Left by The Changes in U.S. Policies

In light of changing U.S. priorities around the enforcement of anti-corruption laws, this paper argues for a “Reverse Marshall Plan” in which liberal democracies take the lead in rolling out an effective international anti-corruption regime with the potential to fully respond to any reduction in the United States’ enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

While the United States has played the leading role prosecuting violations of the FCPA, the international community has played an ever-increasing role in U.S. prosecutions. FCPA cases are now completely transnational in scope, with whistleblowers from over 135 countries being the key informants, and over 47 non-U.S. law enforcement agencies working hand-in-hand on the U.S. cases. 

Given the internationalization of FCPA enforcement, over 71% of all sanctions obtained in these cases concern corporations headquartered outside the U.S. The sanctions obtained from these non-U.S. companies topped $21 billion, all of which can be reinvested to benefit the victims of corruption, offset the costs of prosecutions, and fill the void in funding for NGOs and newspapers covering corruption issues. 

This paper sets out six steps which democracies should follow in order to implement a “Reverse Marshall Plan.” The steps are based on the successes of the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention and the growing international acceptance of highly effective detection and enforcement tactics used by U.S. prosecutors under the FCPA. Together these proven models provide a powerful foundation for liberal democracies (and other nations committed to anti-corruption) to pick-up where the U.S. left off.

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References

  1. The author would like to thank his Chief Law Clerk Melissa Revuelta who was responsible for researching and analyzing the extensive data used in the charts and addendum.
  2. See, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. Also see, House and Senate Reports, House Reports.94-831, 95-640 and 105-802; Sen. Rep. 95-114; U.S. Department of Justice, “FCPA Unit,” https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act; “The Ultimate Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto LLP https://kkc.com/frequently-asked-questions/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/
  3. For example, in its 2020 Phase IV audit of the United States the OECD described the overall U.S. program in glowing terms: “Overall, the level of FCPA enforcement . . . reflects the United States’ continued strong commitment to fighting foreign bribery as well as its prominent role in promoting the implementation of the Convention . . . The lead examiners commend the United States for its sustained and demonstrable commitment to enforcing its foreign bribery offence . . . The overall enforcement pattern confirms the prominent role that the United States plays globally in combating foreign bribery,” Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Phase 4 Report: United States (September 23, 2020) https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/0cd34e9f-en-1.pdf
  4. Pausing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement to Further American Economic and National Security (February 10, 2025) https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Pausing-Foreign-Corrupt-Practices-Act-Enforcement-to-Further-American-Economic-and-National-Security-–-The-White-House.pdf
  5. Kohn, Stephen “Crippling the FCPA Is Bad Business for the U.S.” NYU School of Law Compliance and Enforcement Blog (March 13, 2025) https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2025/03/13/crippling-the-fcpa-is-bad-business-for-the-u-s/
  6. The past success of the FCPA and the United States’ overall anti-corruption program is explained in a guide jointly published by the U.S. Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission. See, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Second Edition https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/fcpa-guide-2020_final.pdf. Also see, Stephen M. Kohn, Rules for Whistleblowers: A Handbook for Doing What’s Right,” (Lyons Press, 2023), pp, 37-48, 150-53, 155-75 (hereinafter, “Rules”).
  7. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2bfa620e-en.pdf
  8. Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/OECD-LEGAL-0378-en.pdf
  9. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions Ratification Status as of September 2024 https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/OECD-WGB-Ratification-Status-September-2024.pdf
  10. Revuelta, Melissa and Nemes, Cole and Shirazi, Sami “Data Shows International Focus of FCPA Enforcement.” Whistleblower Network News (February 28, 2025) https://whistleblowersblog.org/foreign-corruption-whistleblowers/data-shows-international-focus-of-fcpa-enforcement/
  11. Public Law 111–203, online at https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/4173/text.
  12. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6, available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2020-title15/pdf/USCODE-2020-title15-chap2B-sec78u-6.pdf. The SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower’s website is located at: https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/whistleblower-program. Under Dodd-Frank, whistleblowers who voluntarily provide “original information” to the SEC that results in a sanction of over $1 million are entitled to a minimum award of 10% and a maximum award of 30% of any sanctions obtained from a wrongdoer, including the total amount of fines, penalties, and disgorgement in FCPA cases.
  13. “Enforcement Actions.” Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Clearinghouse https://fcpa.stanford.edu/enforcement-actions.html
  14. “Odebrecht and Braskem Plead Guilty and Agree to Pay at Least $3.5 Billion in Global Penalties to Resolve Largest Foreign Bribery Case in History.” Department of Justice (December 21, 2016) https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/odebrecht-and-braskem-plead-guilty-and-agree-pay-least-35-billion-global-penalties-resolve
  15. “Airbus Agrees to Pay over $3.9 Billion in Global Penalties to Resolve Foreign Bribery and ITAR Case.” Department of Justice (January 31, 2020) https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/airbus-agrees-pay-over-39-billion-global-penalties-resolve-foreign-bribery-and-itar-case
  16. “Ericsson Agrees to Pay Over $1 Billion to Resolve FCPA Case.” Department of Justice (December 6, 2019) https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/ericsson-agrees-pay-over-1-billion-resolve-fcpa-case
  17. Revuelta, Melissa. “Data Shows International Focus of FCPA Enforcement.” Whistleblower Network News (February 28, 2025) https://whistleblowersblog.org/foreign-corruption-whistleblowers/data-shows-international-focus-of-fcpa-enforcement/
  18. “Mobile Telesystems Pjsc and Its Uzbek Subsidiary Enter into Resolutions of $850 Million with the Department of Justice for Paying Bribes in Uzbekistan.” Department of Justice (March 7, 2019) https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/mobile-telesystems-pjsc-and-its-uzbek-subsidiary-enter-resolutions-850-million-department
  19. See Addendum 2.
  20. The OECD conducts regular audits of the nation-state signatories of the Anti-Bribery Convention. These audits generally include a summary of all FCPA prosecutions conducted by each country, along with recommendations for improving each country’s FCPA laws and investigative practices. Access to all of the monitoring reports are published on-line at https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/fighting-foreign-bribery.html.
  21. The OECD audits demonstrate that the United States has, by far, prosecuted the most amount of FCPA cases, and obtained the largest verdicts. The results for other countries have been mixed. For example, the OECD’s most recent monitoring report for France confirmed that France was making “notable progress in enforcing its foreign bribery” laws, and between October 2012 and July 2021 had filed 14 cases, imposing sanctions on “19 individuals and 23 legal persons.” See, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/implementing-the-oecd-anti-bribery-convention-phase-4-report-france_2c7d8500-en.html. But Canada’s prosecutorial history has been far less rosy: “. . . enforcement of the foreign bribery offence remains exceedingly low 25 years after the adoption of [Canada’s anti-bribery law], considering the size of Canada’s economy and the industrial sectors in which its companies operate. Since the entry into force of the [law] in 1999 . . . conclusion of foreign bribery cases with sanctions remains scarce, with only two individuals convicted for foreign bribery and four companies sanctioned,” https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/implementing-the-oecd-anti-bribery-convention-phase-4-report-canada_a063fdd3-en.html.
  22. Kohn, Stephen “Crippling the FCPA Is Bad Business for the U.S.” NYU School of Law Compliance and Enforcement Blog (March 13, 2025) https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2025/03/13/crippling-the-fcpa-is-bad-business-for-the-u-s/; Rolls-Royce, “Rolls-Royce Completes Agreements with Investigating Authorities,” Press Release (January 17, 2017).
  23. “Enforcement Actions.” Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Clearinghouse, https://fcpa.stanford.edu/enforcement-action.html?id=660.
  24. Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Phase 4 Report: United States (September 23, 2020) https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/0cd34e9f-en-1.pdf.
  25. Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Phase 4 Follow-Up Report: United States (October 20, 2022) https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/d994f92a-en-1.pdf.
  26. See, OECD, “United States and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,” https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/fighting-foreign-bribery/united-states-country-monitoring.html.
  27. Rules, pp. 137-65.
  28. See Page 10, Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Phase 4 Follow-Up Report: United States (October 20, 2022) https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/d994f92a-en-1.pdf.
  29. Lockhart, Eliza. “The Inside Track: The Role of Financial Rewards for Whistleblowers in the Fight Against Economic Crime.” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (December 2024) https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/SOC-ACE-RP31_Whistleblowing-Dec24-1.pdf.
  30. “What the CFTC’s Settlement with Vitol Inc. Portends about Enforcement Trends” Gibson Dunn (January 20, 2021) https://www.gibsondunn.com/what-the-cftcs-settlement-with-vitol-inc-portends-about-enforcement-trends/.
  31. “CFTC Orders Vitol Inc. to Pay $95.7 Million for Corruption-Based Fraud and Attempted Manipulation.” Commodities Future Trading Commission (December 3, 2020) https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8326-20.
  32. “CFTC Orders Glencore to Pay $1.186 Billion for Manipulation and Corruption” Commodities Future Trading Commission (May 24, 2022) https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8534-22.
  33. “CFTC Orders Trafigura to Pay $55 Million for Fraud, Manipulation and Impeding Communications with the CFTC” Commodities Future Trading Commission (June 17, 2024) https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8921-24.
  34. Lockhart, Eliza. “The Inside Track: The Role of Financial Rewards for Whistleblowers in the Fight Against Economic Crime.” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (December 2024) https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/SOC-ACE-RP31_Whistleblowing-Dec24-1.pdf.
  35. Gary Becker “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” 76 Journal of Political Economy 169-217 (1968) (corporate crime was “rational”). See Rules, p. 278 (explaining Becker’s theory concerning why, without a realistic chance of being caught and paying a significant penalty white-collar crime is good for business and will continue unabated).
  36. Edwin Sutherland, Principles of Criminology (U.S. Armed Forces Institute, 1939)(“White-collar criminaloids, however, are the most dangerous to society of any type of criminals from the point of view of the effects on private property and social institutions . . . [they are] “indirect, devious, anonymous, and impersonal . . . [they are committed by the] “upper classes.”
  37. Kohn, Stephen. “Why Whistleblowing Works: A New Look at the Economic Theory of Crime” (April 16, 2024) https://ssrn.com/abstract=4796825.
  38. Lockhart, Eliza. “The Inside Track: The Role of Financial Rewards for Whistleblowers in the Fight Against Economic Crime.” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (December 2024) https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/SOC-ACE-RP31_Whistleblowing-Dec24-1.pdf.
  39. Lockhart, Eliza. “The Inside Track: The Role of Financial Rewards for Whistleblowers in the Fight Against Economic Crime.” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (December 2024) https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/SOC-ACE-RP31_Whistleblowing-Dec24-1.pdf.
  40. Although the RUSI report concluded that award laws had no negative impact on internal reporting, whistleblowers should be careful about internal disclosures as the majority of retaliation cases arise from internal reporting, as opposed to reporting to the government. See Kohn, Stephen and Petit, Alyce and Reeves, Kate and Schweller, Geoff. “Whistleblower Disclosures: An Empirical Risk Assessment” (January 10, 2024) https://ssrn.com/abstract=4690852; Rules, pp. 65-79.
  41. The White House internet sites confirming the removal of the Strategy are located here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/United-States-Strategy-on-Countering-Corruption.pdf.
  42. United States Strategy Countering Corruption (January 2021) https://kkc.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/United-States-Strategy-on-Countering-Corruption.pdf.
  43. Kohn, Stephen and Revuelta, Melissa. “Revisiting The Arguments Against Whistleblower Award Laws: It’s Time for a Change” (July 10, 2024). https://ssrn.com/abstract=4891390
  44. “Director Ephgrave’s speech at RUSI 13 February 2024” Serious Fraud Office and Nick Ephgrave QPM https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/director-ephgraves-speech-at-rusi-13-february-2024.
  45. Schweller, Geoff. “UK Announces Plans for Tax Whistleblower Award System Modeled on US” Whistleblower Network News (March 13, 2025) https://whistleblowersblog.org/global-whistleblowers/uk-tax-whistleblower-award-system/.
  46. For an extensive list of experts and government officials whose studies and public statements endorse the OECD/RUSI/U.S. FCPA models see Rules, pp. 391-95.

ENDORSE THE RESOLUTION

A Reverse Marshall Plan for Anti-Corruption: Liberal Democracies Can Fill the Void Left by The Changes in U.S. Policies

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